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Since the independence of Pakistan from the South Asian subcontinent in 1947, the 
country has repeatedly looked for amiable relations with the United States. The relationship 
between the two countries has remained inconsistent and dependent on third countries and 
pending situations. Immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the relationship 
remained strong as both countries pledged to be allies against the war on terror. Since then, the 
diplomatic relationship between the two countries has been declining due to no pressing need for 
cooperation. This strain of correspondence politically has seeped into potential economic 
decisions.  
The biggest need for the South Asian country currently is in its energy department. 
Pakistan has a growing number of decisions to make regarding its natural gas sources. Soon after 
Independence in 1947, the Sui natural gas field was discovered in Balochistan. Production began 
in 1955, but the field has peaked by 1985. The Sui field has remained the nation’s most 
productive field until the 1990s, producing 46% of the nation’s consumption around 1993. 
Balochistan is also home to the second largest field, which produces about 20% of national 
consumption. Around 1993, there were twenty five operational fields, but that large of a number 
would not be enough.  i 
The demand for natural gas has increased by 50%, from 2003 to 2006 due to large 
internal consumption. Natural gas is the largest energy source for the country and depleting, 
leaving Pakistan in a stressful situation to find alternative energy sources for the future. ii 
Pakistan has discovered 32 Tcf of crude gas reserves and already produced 11 Tcf of that 
quantity. iii Natural gas is expected to decline over the next 25 years but the demand is scheduled 
to keep increasing due to population growth. iv Drastic measures need to be explored to combat 
the growing need internally.    
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Since Pakistan has realized it cannot meet its needs through domestic production, it has 
been seeking alignments through international natural gas pipelines. At this point, the two most 
discussed options are the (1) IPI - a pipeline beginning in Iran, going through Pakistan and 
ending in India, and the (2) TAP - starting in Turkmenistan, going through Afghanistan and 
ending in Pakistan. Both pipelines would ease the flow of natural gas to the country, but bring a 
plethora of regional conflicts into the picture. The introduction of Iran on the scene is a strong 
point of contention with the United States who is applying pressure to Pakistan to shift it away 
from the IPI pipeline and towards the TAP, due to personal concerns with the instability in Iran. 
Pakistan is being asked to put aside its internal needs and make a choice between two viable 
options. The dilemma posed by the US to Pakistan is over the choice of diplomatic security or 
economic security. Further, Pakistan’s internal needs need to be balanced with the United States 
security concerns. The US has staking interests and concerns in both pipelines discussed and any 
decision made by Pakistan would have large ramifications within the United States. To better the 
trauma-oriented diplomatic relationship with the US, Pakistan should invest in the TAP pipeline 
and discard the IPI; however, the historical periods of contention indicate that it would not be a 
policy crisis if Pakistan followed its energy interest and continued progress on both pipelines – 
the situation could be fixed later. The best path for the country of Pakistan, to better its energy 
crisis, is to invest in both the Iran-Pakistan-India and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan 
pipelines, keeping the United States opposition in mind, but not limiting internal choices by fear. 
For the United States, at this point the best option would be to still place pressure in the attempt 
to cripple the IPI but support the TAP. Suffering relations with Pakistan would be detrimental at 
this point because the South Asian Muslim country is a necessary ally in the current war on 
terror.  
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In usual discussions on the topic, the South Asian countries needs are placed in a 
submissive nature to the United States. Often, this is due to the US’s strategic position in the 
world as a sole hegemon. In this policy brief, the attempt it to balance Pakistan’s internal needs 
with those of the dominating world power.  
Section I – US/Pakistani Historical Diplomatic Relations  
Being only 60 years old, the country of Pakistan is relatively new to the global diplomatic 
situation. The British granted the Indian subcontinent independence in August of 1947 and 
created Pakistan as a home to the Muslim population.   The policy tripod that Pakistan adopted 
early included a strong alliance with the west. Jinnah, the founder and first president of the 
nation stated, “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America…Pakistan is the pivot 
of the world, as we are placed… [on] the frontier of which the future position of the world 
revolves.” v The next head of state, General Ayub Khan, visited Washington and stated that he 
was looking for a “deal whereby Pakistan could – for the right price – serve as the West’s eastern 
anchor in an Asian alliance structure.” vi 
The 1950s-1970s placed Pakistan in a strategic place throughout the Cold War and the 
opening of China. Pakistan conceded a security relationship to the US in return for economic 
assistance. Yahya Khan, the new military ruler in the 1970s actually facilitated Henry 
Kissinger’s secret trip to China through Pakistan. In return, the US president tilted towards 
Pakistan during an internal conflict between the East and West portions of the country. The lack 
of effort for assistance led to an internal view that “Pakistan should continue to seek US 
assistance; it should neither depend on the United States nor trust it.” vii When the Soviets 
invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan became the emerging player, as the US and Pakistan joined forces 
to fund the resistance.  However, their convergence can be attributed to personal agendas rather 
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than hopes to increase bilateral relations. The Cold war legacy that was left of the two countries 
going to each other at times of need has remained through the political interactions they have had 
especially in the past two decades.  
In the 1990s, the relationship experienced fluctuation based on the changing of power 
that occurred in Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto, then prime minister decreased the sanctions imposed 
under the Pressler Amendment passed in 1990, which called for a freezing of the $564 million 
economic and military aid program. viii ix The US comfort with her is often attributed to three 
main concessions: (1) her cooperation on the dual containment of Iraq and Iran, (2) she agreed to 
let the CIA strengthen their presence to monitor Iran and (3) she backed the US oil company 
Unocal in the pushing for the TAP pipeline.x The next in line, Nawaz Sharif saw immediate 
decline in US relations. His ambassador to Washington, Abida Hussain observed, “American 
interest in Pakistan was no more than Pakistani interest in the Maldives.”xi The US had declared 
Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism and decreased US economic aid forcing the foreign reserves 
to go from $12 billion to $900 million. xii  
With the terrorist attack on the US on September 11, 2001, Pakistan was again in 
strategic placement to a US interest – Afghanistan. In return for an alliance, General Musharraf 
sought the right price for cooperation, “[believing] he was restructuring Pakistan’s priorities to 
retain and rebuild the relationship with the United States.” He lifted US sanctions for state 
sponsored terrorism and received a $3 billion five year economic and military aid package. xiii 
When that finished in 2006, the relationship was declining as Pakistani leaders were seen in 
defiance of the nuclear nonproliferation issue and negating US interests. Further, President Bush 
spent a few days in India signing a nuclear cooperation pact and then proceeded to Pakistan for 
only a day offering no similar document. He criticized Musharraf for not doing enough to stop 
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insurgents in Balochistan and for the lack of democracy in the country. Another point of 
contention was the closing of the case of Dr. Qadeer Khan, a nuclear scientist projected to have 
sold nuclear information to Iran. The case was closed when the US was lobbying for permission 
to interrogate him personally. xiv 
As evident through bilateral relations, the friendship remains very selfish. The US 
ambassador to Pakistan, Ryan Crocker admitted in the past that the US allies with Pakistan on a 
single issue and walks away immediately afterwards. Currently, the US feels comfortable enough 
with Pakistan to make strong remarks about their internal choices. This historical relationship 
must be put into perspective when dealing with the pipeline choice newly affronted to Pakistan. 
Due to this US pressure, Pakistan is faced with the option of making a choice between the two 
lines.   
   The War on Terror and the Needs of the United States 
One event drastically in recent history drastically changed the situation and methods of 
foreign policy and diplomacy for the United States. The September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 
consisted of four planes being hijacked and flown into US icons. Two of these planes hit the 
World Trade Center, one in the Pentagon and the last crashed in a small town in Pennsylvania. 
The estimated total carnage was around 3,000 deaths; however the blow to the American people 
was un-measurable. The perpetrators were nineteen Saudi men assumed to be part of an 
extremist Muslim terrorist organization known as Al-Qaeda. The reaction to the attacks was an 
institutionalized War on Terror from the Bush administration. The goal was to eradicate 
extremism and violent outbreak throughout the world. The immediate enemy became 
Afghanistan, where the leader of the Al-Qaeda movement, Osama bin Laden, was said to be 
hiding. After this, though it was claimed to be unrelated, the United States invaded Iraq with the 
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aspiration to remove their dictator Saddam Hussain. The push was to establish democracy in a 
majority Muslim country, but there was speculation regarding the intent for the sudden invasion. 
Further, there seemed to be a thread between the two invasions, as both countries were Muslim 
majority. Despite the Bush administration’s adamant support for the Iraq invasion, there has been 
speculation on their concentration, Richard Clarke, a former White House counter terrorism 
specialist, has stated that, “so much of the US government’s attention is on Iraq that they are 
really not thinking conceptually about the war on terrorism.” xv 
 With the War on Terror, the United States has external needs when dealing with Pakistan. 
First, since Bin Laden was not found in Afghanistan, many government analysts have deduced 
that he is probably hiding in the outskirts of Pakistan. While the country has pledged to assist the 
United States in a search for him, it has been almost seven years since the event and nothing has 
surfaced. US fears are still alive of his presence in Pakistan, and the diplomatic relationship has a 
large bearing on this contingency. If there is future hope to find bin Laden, Pakistani-US 
relations have to be functional and friendly. The second concern lies with the fact that the 
Pakistan-US alliance is important to maintain due to Pakistan’s strategic geographical location 
close to Central and South Asian countries. Pakistan, being a Muslim country, will be an 
important ally to maintain for the United States and its future interests.  
Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline 
The Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (IPI) or the “peace pipeline” was considered to transport 
natural gas through a 2600-mile distance from Iran’s South pars field to India. Approximately, 
400 miles of the line would pass through the region of Balochistan in southern Pakistan. The 
pipeline is anticipated to transport 90 million standard cubic meters per day to India and around 
60 million standard cubic meters per day to Pakistan.xvi  
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Iran is the home to the world’s second largest natural gas reserves, and is especially 
hopeful to promote export. They contain about 812 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) and are aspiring to 
use this market to meet modernization demands. South Asia has become the prime market for 
anticipated sales.xvii 
On citation from the Pakistani Oil and Gas Ministry, the construction of the Pakistani 
section of the IPI pipeline is determined to begin by September 2009 and will be completed by 
2011. This area will be 655 km (400 mi) of the entire pipeline and will cost around $2.6 
billion.xviii In March of 2007, Iran has already begun preparation for the work on the 1100 km 
(690 mi) section in its borders, which will be worth around $4 billion. India stated at the same 
time that it was ready to begin construction on its 344 km (215 mi) that would be worth around 
$.6 million. xix By 1995, Pakistan and Iran had signed a preliminary agreement for the 
construction of this pipeline but to date negotiations are still continuing. xxThe entire pipeline is 
anticipated to be functional by 2014. 
The companies involved with this particular pipeline are internal from the three countries 
involved. Foreign correspondence is not a large factor within the process because the countries 
alone do most of the negotiations. Also, there is a personal investment which will ensure 
responsibility throughout the construction process.  
Pakistan remains in the position that it is in critical need of gas. Prime Minister, Shaukat 
Aziz has claimed that IPI is “a win-win proposition for Iran, India and Pakistan,” and indicated 
this could be a confidence boosting measure.xxi Iran is the most geographically convenient 
supplier of natural gas. xxii Most importantly, this pipeline can be established now. The countries 
have the foundations in place and this pipeline option can be an immediate energy option. 
Ziauddin, the editor of the Pakistan Daily Dawn, the pipeline will become a source of revenue 
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for Pakistan. Without much investment, “Pakistan can start getting $500m-$600m in annual 
revenue…there is nothing like it for Pakistan. It will hugely benefit the economy and resolve the 
energy crisis also.” xxiii 
Pakistan also needs this pipeline to better relations with both India and Iran. Indian and 
Pakistani relations have historically always had a hostile undertone and this pipeline would be 
one of a few measures that could better the relationship. Iran has always been an ally of Pakistan 
in the past, siding with them in treaties and in the 1965 war with India. However, Iran, being a 
predominantly Shi’a Muslim country has been angered by Pakistan recently. This has been due 
to the internal discrimination and violence that has broke against the minority Shi’a population 
living in Pakistan. Being a part of this pipeline could better Pakistani relations with both India 
and Iran. Also, this pipeline is very easy to implement. Each side is responsible for its own 
internal construction and there is no fear of backing out.  
Dropping out of this pipeline can prove to be diplomatically unsafe for Pakistan, because 
it cannot allow for a growing relationship between Iran and India.  Iran has recently given Indian 
gas companies contracts in refining and other energy projects that will equal about $40 billion. 
xxiv
 Economically, increased participation in sectors like energy would result in the further 
building of India and Iran’s economics, while Pakistan is left behind in the region. In order to 
compete or even hold a presence with India in the Subcontinent, Pakistan cannot afford these 
losses. India and Iran growing close will have political and economic ramifications for Pakistan. 
Politically, India and Iran’s defense cooperation could result in Indian use of Iranian bases. In 
case of war with Pakistan, the use bases in both countries would allow for a surrounding strategy 
and Pakistan does not have enough military forces to combat an attack from multiple borders. 
Like Iran, India has also been building ties with many major Muslim countries.  India has 
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emerged as Afghanistan’s closest ally in the region after the overthrow of the Taliban. They have 
earned their role through providing enormous amounts of assistance to the country. xxv This 
could be very detrimental to Pakistan, because until now they were seen as the dominant Muslim 
country in the south Asian subcontinent. However, with India’s Muslim population being the 
second largest in the world and their new current affinity to building relations with Muslim 
nations, Pakistan could be pressed with competition for their role.  
Like Iran, India has been building ties with many major Muslim countries. India has 
emerged as Afghanistan’s closest ally in the region after the overthrow of the Taliban. They have 
earned their role through providing enormous amounts of assistance to the country.xxvi This could 
be very detrimental to Pakistan, because until now they were seen as the dominant Muslim 
country in the south Asian subcontinent. However, with India’s Muslim population being the 
second largest in the world and their new current affinity to building relations with Muslim 
nations, Pakistan could be pressed with competition for their role.  
For Pakistan this pipeline is a strong investment but brings a difficult political situation. 
The United States has strongly committed opposition to the construction of this pipeline due to 
the presence of Iran. Tom Lantos, Chairman of the US Congress Foreign Affairs Committee 
submitted a draft law in 2007 that would add restrictions to any country cooperating with Iran on 
a project exceeding $20 million. The restrictions would include bans on nuclear cooperation 
between the US and the third countries. xxvii Pakistan made a statement the day after the US 
stated opposition stating because the Asian Development Bank found it feasible, they would still 
continue their support.xxviii There was also discussion about the fact that if the US has such strong 
objections about the project, it should assist Pakistan in finding alternative ways for the country 
to meet its energy needs. xxix If Pakistan continues with this pipeline, there is fear that the US/Pak 
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relations will reach a new critical low point. Iran has been stated a state sponsor of terrorism and 
historical relations show in the past that the US has continually lobbied against participation with 
Iran to third countries. The current administration sees very little opportunity in the pipeline. 
From the American point of view, Iran would be making an unprecedented big for regional 
power in the Gulf by pursuing this pipeline. xxx  
For the United States, the emergence of an IPI pipeline is a difficult policy implication. 
Because of a historical relationship of tension with Iran, the last thing the US needs is a working 
relationship between Iran and Pakistan, or Iran and India. Pakistan is a Muslim state of crucial 
importance for the United States due to its critical location to Afghanistan and its pivotal 
importance in the war on terror. India, being one of the emerging economies will soon embark on 
a new avenue of diplomatic and economic ties with America and for that reason stressing 
internal relationships now is not in the best US interest. The strong opposition from the United 
States also claims that the deal could potentially assist in funding Iran’s assumed nuclear arms 
program.xxxi 
However, the one benefit that could result from this project is a working relationship 
between India and Pakistan. The United States has often gotten pulled to the center of this 
tension and the “pipeline would reduce the risk of conflict between India and Pakistan.” xxxii The 
problem remains though that, “Washington can't have it both ways.” xxxiiiTeresita Schaffer, the 
Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
has stated that three factors influence India-US relations: the end of the Cold War, the economic 
growth of India and the Indian American community. Schaffer states that under the Iran and 
Libya Sanctions Act, the US is required to take action against anyone who is attempting to assist 
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the economic infrastructure of Iran. Stating “it should handicap the economic development of 
Iran unless the latter changes its policy of terrorism.” xxxiv 
As of March 2008, Iran was still ready to invest in the pipeline, but the Pakistani and 
Indian negotiation process was slowing the construction. The issues of contention are the price 
and transition fees and the three parties are working to find an amiable result. There was some 
concern from the Iranian prime minister over the US influence on India and he claimed he was, 
“sure [they would] get a result soon if the individual parties [took] their own decisions.” At 
current estimates, the entire gas deal is worth around $22 billion US dollars. xxxv 
In April of 2008, Pakistan and Iran had fully resolved all of their issues in relation to the 
pipeline. Pakistan at the time proposed for allowing the pipeline to pass through its territory to 
China, along the Karakoram Highway and Iran’s response to this was positive. xxxvi This 
introduction of China could add to the parallels of the policy crisis for both Pakistan and the 
United States but it is still preliminary. The two ministers have been asked to agree on a date to 
sign the official agreement. On April 30, the oil ministers of the three countries were told to 
submit their final reports within forty-five days to prepare for the pipeline project. xxxvii 
                           Balochistan’s Internal Concerns 
The region of Balochistan has been considered “Pakistan’s Achilles heel” in the Iran-
Pakistan-India pipeline project. Since Pakistan’s independence, this region has been considered 
“out of the mainstream and while [other regions] gradually assimilated in Pakistani society with 
the passage of time, the Balochis moved away. xxxviii  
The Balochistan province is located over 147,000 square miles (43% of the land mass) 
but holds only about 5% of the population. There are many natural resources in the area and most 
of the energy sources. The area is ruled by feudal lords and in the past has been mostly through a 
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confederacy. The Balochistan region in the Pakistan happens to be one of the poorest areas in the 
country.  
Through the IPI, Pakistan is supposed to receive around $200-500 million annually in 
transit fees and the Baloch leaders have demanded a higher royalty out of this amount as well as 
ensured employment for the locals in this project. xxxix Recently, local tribe lords have began 
assembling private militias that would serve the interests of the province. xl The fear of the local 
Balochistani people and tribal lords is that they will be left out of the bargaining situation when 
this pipeline is implemented. The Balochistan’s People Party, self-claimed, as a liberal 
democratic party has discussed the political situation in the British Parliament. They addressed 
the assembly claiming “the Balochistan people have always been deprived of their cultural, 
social, economic and other fundamental rights.” xli There is fear that the federal government will 
take what it can out of the economic pie and leave the area with little, if any revenue. 
Nationalists from the local province have been a hurdle for the implementation of the pipeline. 
The hope of the federal government was to appease the region by investing more in regional 
projects, but this has only backfired.  
The parliamentary leader from the National Party and the leader of the Balochistan 
Assembly opposition party, Kachkol Ali has formally demanded royalties for the IPI pipeline. 
Since the materials are being laid in that particular province there is fear that economic revenue 
will not benefit that specific area. The leader claimed that by international laws, the province was 
allowed to ask for royalties according to provincial rights. Ali also stated that “our [Balochistan] 
development demands were not met, but the development projects in the interest of the 
government were initiated immediately.”xlii 
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In response, militias have attacked pipeline materials and transmission lines already and 
there is a fear that these occurrences will continue.xliii The dissatisfaction between the tribesmen 
and federal government is turning into violent attacks. One of the most active militia groups in 
the region is the Baloch Liberation Front, and in January of 2003, members of this party fired 
rockets at the pipeline and engaged federal security forces. The result of this was the death of six 
individuals and the obliteration of the pipeline in the area. xliv  
The government has taken a firm stance on the violent outbreaks, continually repeating 
that they will not be intimidated by the rebellions in the area. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s 
President has gone as far as warning the local war lords that, “it is not the 1970s and this time 
[they] won’t even know what has hit [them].”xlv The possibility of violent outbursts is still very 
strong for the participating parties. India’s former foreign minister Yashwant Senha has already 
claimed “India must consider Balochistan’s rights in the gas pipeline project.” xlvi The internal 
situation within the region will have strong ramifications on the placement and speed to which 
this pipeline will be implemented.  
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Pipeline 
The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline was an alternative proposal for natural 
gas introduced in the early 1990s by the US.  The pipeline would begin in the Daulatabad fields 
in Turkmenistan and continue through Afghanistan, ending in Multan, Pakistan. The total length 
is expected to be 1500 km (900 mile) and 48 inches in diameter. xlvii xlviii The government of 
Turkmenistan guaranteed to deliver 25 trillion cubic feet (709 billion cubic meters) of the natural 
gas exclusively for this project.xlix The natural gas will be carried at a rate of 2 billion cubic feet 
per day. l   
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The project began as a bilateral investment between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. 
Turkmenistan was scheduled to supply electricity free of cost to Afghanistan for about a month 
and for the remainder of the project would supply at a discounted rate. It was permitted in the 
agreement to transit to second and third countries. li 
The TAP pipeline was put on hold in the late 1990s due to the internal instability in 
Afghanistan. Al Qaeda terrorists attacked the US embassies in Africa and hostility increased in 
Afghanistan due to the fact that the Taliban were harboring the organization. lii However with 
American forces currently in Afghanistan, there is talk of reviving the project. liii Despite their 
presence, most of the countries involved still hold a fear that this project will be a dead 
investment. The concern is to put so many funds into something that could potentially by 
destroyed by internal unrest. The delay in the project due to Afghan instability resulted in an 
escalation of cost from $2 billion to $3 billion. liv 
At the time the proposal was being discussed, there were two major oil companies vying 
for dominance over the project. The companies were the US backed Unocal and the Argentine 
Bridas. The then president of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif signed an agreement with Turkmenistan 
and the US consolidated Unocal Company. Sharif’s trend seemed to indicate bending to US 
pressure. lv By 1998, the project had been disbanded and the US Company formally withdrew. lvi 
Though the project has been recently revived, there are still some shortcomings in the planning 
of this project. There is no indication as to who will fund this project. lvii Unfortunately, without 
economic backing, there is little that can happen with the proposal.  
Pakistan has strong energy interests in this particular pipeline. The natural gas provided 
in this pipeline would be crucial to the growing need internally in the country.  It would decrease 
cost in transportation and power generation in Pakistan. lviii The pipeline would create over 
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10,000 jobs and bring in millions of dollars of additional projects collectively in all three 
countries involved.lix More income would be generated for social development.  President Pervez 
Musharraf stated in 2002 that an LNG (Liquid Natural Gas) plant would be constructed at 
Gwadar (in Southern Pakistan) to convert and export the gas. Along with this, road and rail links 
would be constructed to open more opportunities among the three countries. lx  
Finally, there are diplomatic advantages to the implementation of this pipeline, which is 
projected to “bring about regional security through joint project ownership.” lxi Pakistan has been 
trying to better the relationship it has with the Central Asian Republics and establish itself among 
the Muslim nations in the area.lxii By encouraging this economic relation, diplomatic and foreign 
policy partnerships can also be formed. Another diplomatic advantage to this pipeline is the good 
relationship it will encourage between the United States and Pakistan. There is anticipation that 
good bilateral relations might encourage a nuclear cooperation pact between the countries. 
Further, much of Pakistan’s yearly aid comes from the United States and this would ensure a 
strong relationship for the future.  
 One disadvantage in pursuing this particular pipeline will be the perception that Pakistan 
is following this course of action only to appease the United States. The country will be seen as 
backing down from their internal needs and demands only to take the safe choice upon pressure 
from the United States. The other strong Muslim countries (Iran, Saudi Arabia) have a history of 
making choices independent of US pressure and Pakistan will not be taken seriously if they 
chose the TAP and shelve the IPI, only because of the United States and fear of retaliation from 
them.  
There is also a concern that pipeline will be very unstable for Pakistan in the future. The 
current situation in Afghanistan is one that could potentially worsen if the Taliban returns to 
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power. If this pipeline is invested in at this time, there is no guarantee for security in the future. 
Finally, one of the biggest concerns regarding this pipeline is the time it will take for it to be 
implemented. It is anticipated that this particular pipeline will take fourteen to fifteen years. The 
natural gas reserves in Turkmenistan still need to be nationally certified. The timeline is 
unrealistic for Pakistan’s energy needs. lxiii Since there is no funding solidified at this point, the 
investment would be done fully by the country. The risk and economic ruin of losing the given 
funding would be too large for Pakistan to bear without the economic benefits that the line would 
bring.  
 Various regional players have developing interests in the implementation of the TAP 
pipeline. Turkmenistan and Afghanistan both intend to have strong benefits from this pipeline. 
Like Pakistan, their energy economies will increase dramatically. Afghanistan alone expects to 
earn $100-200 million in transit rents of the pipeline. lxiv Besides the three already involved 
nations, India was officially invited to the pipeline in 2006 transforming the project into the 
TAPI. lxv lxvi  
Iran and Russia also have diplomatic ramifications invested as both are looking for larger 
regional power in various ways. Iran does not want to be left out of the strategic planning in that 
particular region. lxvii It would undermine their regional presence and their bid for larger power 
through the IPI pipeline. The construction of the TAP would be detrimental to the possibility of 
the IPI. If Pakistan invests in this, Iran would consider the choice based on the US. If that were 
the case, the IPI would automatically be shelved for the same reasons. Russia has also entered 
the scene by signing a 25-year natural gas agreement with Turkmenistan and buying at ½ the 
international price. lxviii The energy would increase internal stability in the country and 
diplomatically make Russia prominent again in the running of Central Asian affairs. With this 
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first intrusion, the possibility of Russia attempting to gain a presence in the TAP would be 
anticipated.  
 In April of 2008, India entered the scene with a formal declaration of interest in the line 
and at a project steering committee meeting signed a framework agreement to facilitate the 
construction of the line. The pipeline will now be the TAPI and 1,680 km supplying around 90 
million standard cubic meters. lxix 
The United States has put in full support for this pipeline as an alternative to the IPI. To 
the current Pakistani Embassy, their interior motive seems to be to try to move Central Asian 
nations more toward South Asian, rather than let them deviate towards Russia. lxx Russia has 
always had a strong hand in this region and encouraging a South Asian relationship will be 
beneficial for the United States. The reality remains that gas demands are scheduled to expand 
exponentially. The demands are scheduled to increase to the point, where there is even 
conversation about a third pipeline from the Middle East. lxxi 
Policy Recommendation: Pakistan 
 In this quagmire of pipeline options, Pakistan is being asked to make a decision – leaving 
behind the IPI pipeline and instead investing in the TAP project. Both pipelines will assist the 
internal development of Pakistan enormously and in the end, Pakistan’s safest bet is to pursue 
both pipelines.  The IPI will provide natural gas to the Northern region of the country, while the 
TAP will counter gas needs in the Southern areas. Also, the IPI is immediately available, while 
the TAP will take many years to be implemented.  
 The most important reason for supporting both lines is the unmistakable energy needs in 
the country. The Asian Development Bank has conducted feasibility studies on both pipelines.lxxii 
They determined the IPI project an “economically and financially viable project.”lxxiii For the 
       Sheikh 19 
TAP, the Bank was planned to act as the lead development partner.lxxiv Pakistan’s natural gas 
needs are immediate while diplomatic ramifications are negotiable in the future.   
 The proposal placed by the United States to choose does not seem fair, due to the 
unstable relations the two countries have had in the past. Pakistan and the United States only turn 
to each other at times of need. Because of this uncertainty, Pakistan needs to reassess its personal 
needs in the context of political ramifications. The Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline and the 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline should both be discussed in detail. The IPI could 
supply energy needs to the Northern half of the country and eventually when the TAP would be 
ready to implement, it could supply the Southern half of the country. lxxv Because of the 
uncertain situation with both energy needs and diplomatic relationship, Pakistan not putting its 
needs first when making a policy decision seems unsafe.  
Diplomatically, Pakistan needs to be visualized as a major Muslim country and both 
pipelines will encourage this role. The advantages heavily outweigh the disadvantages for this 
particular choice. For the IPI, it is crucial for Pakistan to revive relations with Iran, especially in 
prevention of a future war with India. Iran has been known as a leader in the Muslim world. If 
Pakistan increases a working relationship with the country, it will gain further credibility as a 
Muslim nation. If Pakistan packs out of the IPI pipeline now, its credibility will be at stake. The 
country will not be taken seriously in consideration for similar efforts in the future. It will be 
perceived as falling quickly under pressure from the United States. Also, the relationship with 
India will be encouraged with this pipeline. The two countries have been rivals since their 
independence and the economic bilateralism will encourage conversation.  
 For the TAP pipeline, Pakistan will again increase its stature with the Central Asian 
Muslim nations. Upon inception, the country of Pakistan has prided itself on being a haven for 
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South Asia’s Muslims. Both of these pipelines will encourage the perception throughout the 
world for the country to be taken seriously throughout the Muslim ummah. Also, since funding 
as not been completely configured, Pakistan would have time to set its terms and needs in order 
before the implementation would take place.  
It should not be taken lightly that US opposition to the IPI does complicate the decision 
making process strongly. Making enemies with a world power like the United States is a 
dangerous road. The region of Central and South Asia will always be a critical area of study due 
to the occurrences of September 11 and the obsession with terror attacks. There will never be a 
return to a period of disengagement in South and Central Asia and Pakistan must keep in mind 
the dangerous path that could unravel due to taking a strong stance against the western nation.  
However, the reality remains that the United States and Pakistan have had times of 
tension in the past and revived their relationship every time. When there is need for policy 
realignment, it has always happened. A slight disobedience in this case can still be fixed in the 
future. There is no indication that the historical relationship between the two countries will 
change. Policy makers and diplomats certainly have the power to implement both pipelines and 
still emerge on fair terms with the United States.  
The importance of Pakistan remains central to US policies, because it can serve as a 
counter weight to Iran in the region, having twice as large of a population and a military of 
400,000. lxxvi If administrations hope to gain further information about Iran, Pakistan can be a 
good source if they implement the pipeline and better relations. If another tense situation should 
occur in that region of the world, the reality remains that Pakistan is still the most likely to work 
with the United States to ensure a safe world environment. There is no reason Pakistan cannot 
put its internal needs first, as every country does and will continue to do. The United States 
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always has the option to use Pakistan’s choice to further their own political agendas in the 
region. This one pipeline will not hinder years of US policy goals. It will just be another period 
of time in the changing atmosphere in the region of South Asia.  
Policy Recommendation: United States  
 The United States is firmly embedded in fighting a strong war on terror internationally. 
Due to the nature of this conflict, the enemy knows no geographic, ethnic or religious lines. The 
enemy lies in various countries and administrations across the world. The search for Bin Laden 
took American military power into Afghanistan. Months later, the effort for democratization took 
the country into Iraq. The next branch of this war is unanticipated and could erupt at any part of 
the world. There is also no concrete policy that could not be changed a later date. Because of this 
realization, Central and South Asia have become primary areas of interest for United States 
foreign policy. This has been due to their proximity to the recent conflict zones and because of 
the internal stability that has been occurring in the recent decade politically, socially and 
economically.  
 Both the Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan line 
cross borders that will be crucial to American international security in the present and near 
future. Condemning the IPI pipeline is part of the United State’s stated and enforced foreign 
policy. Any country that begins or continues an economic relationship with Iran has to be 
sanctioned and condemned by the US. Further, a strong alliance between Iran and Pakistan could 
be hurtful to the US because it would establish a strong bond between two Muslim countries that 
are crucial within their regions.  The United States would further weaken some of its hegemonic 
influence if it was seen as unable to exert its influence in situations where the country has 
projected strong opinions. Despite the established legal constraints, there is always the chance 
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that the laws could change and the policies could change. Since most of this relies on the current 
administration, there is always a possibility that with a new administration could come a new 
policy agenda.  
 The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan is one that the United States should continue to 
actively advocate for. A strong relationship in Central Asia is crucial to US foreign policy and to 
counter a strong Middle East. Trust between South and Central Asian countries and the Untied 
States will be necessary in the future to retain stability in that region and to counter potential 
conflicts in other areas in the world. Making this pipeline economically feasible would help in 
the process to make the pipeline acceptable to its regional participants.  
     Policy Combination 
 Pakistan and the United States have separate and diverging interests. However, the reality 
remains that both must co-exist in a peaceful world and with a working relationship to protect 
both of their interests. The United States holds the dominance in the relationship due to its status 
of being a hegemon. Angering such a strong power could be dangerous for a developing country. 
This however is not a permanent place. Changing global values and fluctuating economic 
interests could change the strategic places of the two countries in the developed and developing 
world.  
 Despite this understanding, the fact remains that each country must pursue a foreign 
policy that will ultimately further its own diplomatic and economic goals. Pakistan cannot 
survive on the path it is going. It must invest in natural gas possibilities now. For this reason, 
pursuing both the IPI and the TAP are crucial for the country. Pakistan will have to deal with the 
internal issues regarding the IPI though, as dissent through the form of the provincial violence in 
Balochistan arises and may continue to escalate.  If Pakistan chooses to invest in the IPI 
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anyways, the United States can use the internal knowledge to further their policy goals anyways. 
As far as the other line, the US must work on ways to make the TAP economically feasible for 
the region.  In contrast, US must continually advocate shelving the IPI and pursuing the TAP at 
this current time due to its legal constraints. With a new administration and policy agenda, this 
obstruction could change with time.  
Regardless of the tense and dire situation that the lines perpetuate, these two pipelines 
will not eternally crush the diplomatic relationship Pakistan and the US have.  
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